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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ADMIRALTY.
That the common danger to which the whole adventure
must be exposed and from which, by the sacrifice of a part, the
General rest must be preserved to constitute a case of
Average general average, need not be an actual but only
an apparent danger, has been once more asserted in a recent
case: The Wordrwortli, 88 Fed. 313. The forepeak of the
vessel being discovered full of water, her master and officers
believed that there was a hole below the water-line, a serious
menace to the ship and cargo. The sluices leading to the
next compartment were accordingly opened and an examina-
tion made. It was found that the leak could easily be repaired.
The water damage to the flour in the next compartment was
held by Judge Brown to be a proper subject for general
average contribution.
Where a vessel's owners do not provide the master with
proper charts, and by their directions contribute to the impru-
dent navigation which leads to a stranding, they cannot
recover a general average charge from the cargo owners for
their indemnity: Trinidad Shipping and Trading Co. v.
Frame, Alston & Co., 88 Fed. 528. This case follows the
ordinary rule that a man cannot recover for a loss which has
been caused by his own fault. It is to be distinguished from
the case of Chrystallv. Flint, 82 Fed. 472, in which the owner,
being exempted by the Harter Act (Act Feb. 13, 1893). from
liability for the negligent stranding, was permitted to recover
a general average contribution from the owners of the cargo.
See 37 Amt. LAw REG. (N. S.) 23, (Jan. 1898).
The freedom of admiralty pleading from narrow technicalities
is well illustrated in the recent case of The H-ighand Light, 88
Fed. 296. To a libel in rem to recover money
Pleading earned by libellants as stevedores in loading The
Highldand Light and another vessel, a cross libel was filed to
recover damages for breach of a promise to render towage
services to the vessels in question, and exceptions to the cross
libel were overruled on the ground that the agreements for
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loading and towage were contained in the same instrument,
and each was the consideration for the other.
It seems strange there should have been any doubt in
counsel's mind as to whether timber found drifting with the
Salvage, tide on deep water in a harbor, and out of the con-
Timber trol of the owners, is the subject of salvage. The
short per curiam opinion of the court ought, certainly, to have
removed that doubt: Whitmire v. Cobb, 88 Fed. 91.
AGENCY.
Statements made by an agent, after his principal has made
an assignment for creditors, as to the fraudulent intent of the
Admissions principal, are not admissible to prove fraud, theagency being terminated by the assignment: Wilson
v. Sax, 54 Pac. (Mont.) 46.
A, the mortgagor, resided in New York, and B, the
mortgagee, in California. At the request of A, B sent the
Mortgage, mortgage to an express agent in A's town, with
Payment, instructions to allow A to examine the mortgage,
Titleto Money but not to give it to him unless he paid the mort-
gage debt to the express agent. A went to the office of the
express agent, examined the mortgage, which had just arrived,
and paid the amount to the express agent. At that moment
the sheriff of the county, who had been waiting outside of the
express office under instructions from A, entered and attached
the money in the express agent's hands, by virtue of an at-
tachment issued by A against B for a debt. Held, that, with-
out inquiring into the justice of A's claim against B, the mort-
gage had been satisfied by virtue of payment to B's agent:
Ambrose v. Barrett el al., 53 Pac. (Cal.) 805.
Sullivan v. Sailor, 4o Atl. (Conn.) 1054, decides on familiar
principles that an undisclosed principal in any contract not
Undisclosed involving personal trust and confidence may claim
Principal, the benefit of, and sue on, a contract made by his
Defence agent, subject, of course, to the right of the third
party to use any defence which would have been available
against the agent.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS.
Dearing v. M'Kinnon Dash & Hardware Co., 53 N. Y.
Suppl. 513, is an important case. A Michigan corporation,
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What doing business in New York, had authorized its
Constitutes an officers to execute to a trustee a chattel and a
Assignment real estate mortgage to secure the payment of
certain creditors in a specified order. In the mortgage the
trustee was given discretionary power to sell the assets, and it
contained the usual provision that, in case of their payment,
the instrument should be void; a provision that unpreferred
creditors who assented thereto should be paid out of the
balance, if any; also a provision that the mortgagor might, in
his discretion, continue in business for the purpose of using up
material on hand. In this suit, a replevin by the trustee
against a judgment creditor who had issued execution, it was
held: (I) that the conditional feature of the instrument dis-
tinguished it from an assignment for creditors, and that plaintiff,
as the trustee under a chattel mortgage, would have been
entitled to recover, had it not been (2) that the instrument in
the features above mentioned was likely to hinder and delay
the company's creditors, and, therefore, whatever its name and
form, was in contravention of the Statute of Frauds (sed qucere,
is this a proper description of the familiar Statute of Elizabeth ?).
The rule of interstate comity, of course, did not compel the
court to recognize the validity of an instrument opposed to its.
policy, even though it might have been sustained in Michigan.
CARRIERS.
The Constitution of North Dakota declares that "the fran-
chise, roadway, road bed, . . . etc., shall be assessed by
"Roadway," the state board of equalization." Held, that the
What is word "roadway " includes not only the strip of
Included ground upon which the main line is located, but,
also, all ground necessary for the construction of side tracks,
turnouts, connecting tracks, station houses, freight houses,
and all other accommodations necessary to accomplish the
object for which the company was incorporated: Chdcago, H.
St. P. Ry. Co. v. Coss Co. et al. (Sup. Ct. of N. D.), 76 N. W.
239.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
The United States Circuit Court, Maryland District, has
applied the well-settled rule that statutes of limitation affect
Statue of the remedy, not the substantive right, and are
Limitations, determined by the law of the forum. To a suit
Lex fori,
Statutory brought in Maryland in the Federal court
Rights against a stockholder in a Georgia bank to enforce
of Action a liability imposed by a Georgia statute the-
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defendant pleaded the Maryland statute of limitations, and a
demurrer to this plea was overruled: Brunswick Terminal Co.
v. Nat'l B'k of Baltimore, 88 Fed. 607.
The court refused to follow Andrews v. Bacon, 38 Fed. 778
(1889), and qualified and explained Bank v. Franklin, E20
U. S. 747, 756, 7 Sup. Ct. 757 (i886), cases which appeared
to qualify the general rule, in respect of suits against stock-
holders to enforce a statutory liability to creditors of a corpor-
ation. In the principal case it appeared that the right of
Federal action conferred by the Georgia statute had been
Court. expressly decided by the Georgia courts to be in
State the nature of a specialty. It was, therefore,
Decisions on
"General contended that the obligation, being a specialty in
Law" Georgia, should remain a specialty in Maryland,
and that if any Maryland statute of limitations applied, it was
that relating to specialties. The court disposed of this con-
tention as follows: "There is nothing peculiar to the Georgia
statute which relates to the liability of stockholders which led
the Supreme Court of Georgia to rule that the action was in
the nature of a specialty; and it was from the principles of the
general law, as interpreted by that court, and held by it to be
applicable to actions given by statutes, that the court
reached its conclusion ..... .It was not, therefore, the inter-
pretation of a state statute, but the announcement of a general
rule of law ..... .as to which the decision of a state court is
not binding."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Act of Congress of March I, 1893 (27 Stat. 507), en-
titled "An Act to Create the California D6bris Commission and
Regulation of Regulate Hydraulic Mining in the State of Cali-
Commerce, fornia," was designed to prevent the obstruction
Navigable
Waters, or injury of the navigable waters of the state.
Hydraulic The act contains a provision that the owners of
Mining mining ground in the territory drained by the
Sacramento and San Joaquin river systems, before engaging
in hydraulic mining thereon, shall execute an instrument sur-
rendering to the United States the right to regulate the disposal
of the dfbris. On application by the United States for decree
enjoining the mining carried on by respondent, it was con-
tended that this provision of the act is unconstitutional, as
requiring the surrender of property rights without compensa-
tion. The Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern
District of California declared the provision constitutional,
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since it adds nothing to the authority already possessed by
Congress over all navigable waters within a state, which are
accessible to interstate or foreign commerce. This was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals: Nor/t Bloomfield
Gravel Miln. Co. v. United States, 88 Fed. 664.
CONTRACTS.
In .4falcomson v. Wap poo M7ills et al. (Circuit Court, D.
South Carolina, 88 Fed. 68o), Simonton, C. J., following
Damages, People v. Globe Mitt. Life Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 174,
Performance has decided that damages are not recoverable
Prevented by against a corporation for its failure to perform acontract for the sale and delivery of merchandise,
where performance was prevented solely by the action of a
court in appointing a receiver for the corporation, and enjoin-
ing all other persons from interfering with its business or
property. See, coutra, Spader v. Manufacturing- Co., 20 AtI.
378 (47 N. J. Eq. I8).
A, having entered into a contract with B, assigned his
interest to C, and B was succeeded by D. Held, that C
Parties, could not maintain an action on the contract
Privity against D, there being no privity between them :
Hand v. Evans Marble Co. (Court of Appeals of Maryland),
4o Atl. 899.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Rakestraw v. Lanier, 3o
S. E. 735, has decided that a contract binding one to desist
Restraint of from the practice of a learned profession within a
Trade, certain area, without limit as to time, differs from
Practice o a contract binding one who has sold out a mer-
Profession cantile or other kind of business, and the good
will therewith connected, not to again engage in that business;
and that the former is void as in restraint of trade.
A rule by which it may be determined whether, in a given
case where a builder has failed to comply in all respects with
Substantiai his contract, he shall be allowed to recover on the
Performance, contract with a deduction to cover the defects in
Biling performance, or whether suit on the contract shall
Contract be barred, was laid down in Spence v. Harr, 5o
N. Y. Suppl. 960. Some of the defects went "to the strength
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and stability of the structure; others to inferior materials used
in the work; and others to matters of style and finish." In
deciding that these omissions barred any recovery on the con-
tract the court said that, while strict performance was no
longer a prerequisite to action on the contract, there still had
to be substantial performance, which was referred to as
follows: " Substantial performance permits only such omis-
sions or deviations from the contract as are inadvertent or
unintentional, are not due to bad faith, do not impair the
structure as a whole, are remediable without doing material
damage to other parts of the building in tearing down and
reconstructing, and may, without injustice, be compensated
for by deductions from the contract price."
CORPORATIONS.
That question which has arisen so often and received varied
treatment of late years, namely, the powers and duties of the
Reorganiza- members of a voting trust, arose in the case of
tion Haines v. K. & H. Ry. Co., 52 N. Y. Suppl. io6i.
Committee, By the terms of the reorganization of the road a
Voting Trust committee of nine was named, who were to con-
stitute the first board of directors, and to hold and vote sixty
per cent. of the new stock until such time, not exceeding five
years, when in their judgment the condition of the road should
warrant the distribution of the stock. Plaintiff, a party to the
agreement, later asked for an injunction to restrain the mem-
bers of the committee from longer acting as such and voting
on the stock held in trust, averring that five of the defendants
had disposed of their individual holdings of stock, thereoy
disqualifying themselves from longer acting as directors. A
minority of the committee, having retained their shares, claimed
the sole right to vote the trust stock. The court took the
view that, while those who had sold out might no longer be
qualified to act as directors, yet they were still members of the
organization committee, since they were "originally trusted as
individuals, irrespective of their financial interest in the old or
new company." It was further held that, if necessary, an
injunction would issue to prevent the minority of the com-
mittee exercising the exclusive right to vote. All the
members of the committee should exercise the power vested
in them as long as permitted by the agreement, free from any
interference tending to defeat the object for which it was
formed.
PROGRESS OF THE LAW. 703
CRIMINAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in State v. Ash, 54 Pac. 184,
Compounding decided that, where a police officer compounds a
Crimes, crime, it is no defence to an indictment for it,
Defence that he subsequently procured the conviction of
the offender.
Under the rule that an oath to be sufficient, must be in such
-a form as to furnish a foundation for an indictment for perjury
Oath, if it is false, the test is whether it would authorize
Sufficiency an indictment, not whether it would warrant a
conviction: Ward v. City of Brooklyn et al. (Sup. Court, App.
Div. N. Y.), 53 N. Y. Suppl. 41.
DAMAGES.
A very difficult question arises when one person has
through a mistake taken possession of the property of another
Personal and, by labor, changed its form and enormously
Property, increased its value. Should the original owner be
Conversion, allowed to bring replevin for the article in its
Measure of altered form, or, if he sues for the conversion,
Recovery should the measure of damages be the original
value of the article or its increased value through the work of
the trespasser ? The Supreme Court of Arkansas, following
the leading cases of Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 3 18 (1871),
.and Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332 (1877), has decided
that where defendant had innocently cut down plaintiff's trees
and converted them into cross-ties, replevin would lie, and if
.delivery could not be had, damages could be recovered for the
value of the ties, less the labor expended on the timber: Eaton
v. Langley, 47 S. W. 123.
DEDS.
A, having decided to convey his property to his brother's
-wife as a provision for his brother's children, executed a deed
to said property one month before his death,
Deed, which he believed to be impending, and handed it
D e to his sister-in-law, at the same time telling her
that he deeded her the land and wanted it to go to the children
,at his death. She then returned the deed to A, who placed it
under his pillow, and later gave it to his brother with directions
to have it recorded after A's death. Held, a valid delivery:
Payne et al. v. Hallgartlh et al. (Sup. Ct. of Oregon), 54 Pac.
162.
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It is a familiar rule that an instrument will be given such a
construction, if possible, that it may stand rather than fall.
The main question which arises is, how far the
Defective court will go in remedying defects.
Deed,
Remedy by It is provided by statute in New York, (c. 503,
Court, § 30, Laws 1887), that preferences for creditors
Assignment shall be limited to one-third of the assigned estate.
for Creditors
A deed of assignment, by one clause, expressly
subjected the preferences to the operation of this statute, but,
by a subsequent clause, provided that the residue should be
applied to the " payment of liabilities mentioned in the prefer-
ence." It being clear that the intention was to make a
valid assignment and that that intention would be effectuated
by inserting " not" between the words "liabilities " and
" mentioned," the word was read in, the court saying: "\We
think the intention to insert "not" is clear, that its insertion
is necessary to prevent the defeat of the instrument, and that
we should read it in, or construe the instrument as if it were
in it:" Eliassof v. Eckler, 51 N. Y. Suppl. 892.
EVIDENCE.
On the trial of an issue tb determine the validity of a will
two experts were called for the purpose of proving the tes-
tator's mental incapacity. Hypothetical questions
Testimony, were framed embracing "every angry expression
Insanity, and every controversy with his employes and
Hypothetical those with whom he dealt; every instance of
Questions sleeplessness, nervousness, and forgetfulness,
during the last few years of his life, when his strength was
failing," was included, and acts and expressions separated by
years were so united in the question as to appear part of a
continuing state of mind. The experts answered that such
facts would show insanity, but the court decided that the
experts' testimony did not constitute sufficient facts to take
the case to the jury, saying : "The experience of the courts
has demonstrated that the answers of experts, though hon-
estly given, to hypothetical questions embracing pages of
assumed and isolated facts covering a long lifetime, about
which facts the experts have no personal knowledge, are the
weakest and most unreliable kind of evidence in respect to the
sanity or insanity of the person inquired about:" Dobie v.
Armstrong, 5o N. Y. Suppl. 8oi (Supreme Court).
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In an action to charge the defendant, Grier, with partner-
ship liability, evidence was offered in the Superior Court of
Partnership, Delaware to the following effect : That the follow-
Evidence, ing notice was inserted in a newspaper, "A change
Newspaper has been announced in the canning firm of J. Alex-
item,
Admission by ander Harris & Co. Mr. George S. Grier will be
Silence an active partner in the business this coming
season. So Mr. Harris informs us; " that on the day after
the publication Grier called at the newspaper office and in-
.quired as to the nature of the notice; that the publisher of the
paper read the notice to Grier, who neither affirmed nor
denied it. Held, that the evidence was admissible: Deputy v.
Harris et al., 40 At. 714. Cullen, J., dissented on the ground
that no charge had been made against Grier, which it was
necessary for him to admit or deny, but that it was a mere
rumor.
On appeal to the Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware
the ruling was affirmed: Grier et al. v. Deputy, 40 Atl. 716.
HUSBAND AND WIE.
The Court of Chancery of New Jersey has rendered a de-
•cision upon the vexed question as to whether the fact that a
Pregnancy at woman, upon her marriage, conceals from her
Time of husband her pregnancy by another man is a suffi-
Marriage, cient cause for annulment. The court decided
Concealment that since the husband had no sexual relations
with the wife previous to the marriage, and since he filed
a bill to have the marriage declared a nullity as soon as
he learned the true state of affairs, a decree would be made
that the marriage was void ab initio: Sinclair v. Sinclair, 40
Atl. 679. See 36 Am. LAW REG. 779, 37 Id., 59.
In Wlippon v. Whippon, 51 N. E. (Mass.) 175, the court had
to consider the meaning of a statute that where persons who
Unlawful cannot legally marry go to another state to avoid
Marriage, the law, the marriage shall be void in Massachu-
Innocent setts. Admitting the power of the legislature to
Performance Z
pass such an act the court, nevertheless, held that,
as an infringement of the common law rule, the statute should
be strictly construed, and therefore did not apply to a case
where one of the two persons was not intending to evade the
statute. The libel to have the marriage declared null was
therefore dismissed.
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Fernald v. Providence- Washington Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. Suppl.
838. This case involved a question of importance to vessel
Polic owners. The plaintiff, the owner of a tug, had
Construction, obtained from the defendant a policy covering
"Suit at Law," any liability the tug should incur through col-
Costs lisions, etc., the policy containing a provision
that the insurance company should not be liable unless the
liability of the tug should be determined by a suit at law or
otherwise. A collision occurred, the tug was libeled, and the
plaintiff, at the request of the insurance company, defended
the action. The tug was sold under the decree of court and
the plaintiff, in suing on the policy, claimed the counsel fees
and costs in defending the previous suit, but it was held that,
under the above clause requiring the tug's liability to be
determined by a suit at law, the cost of defending that suit
fell on the plaintiff, and not on the insurance company.
LIBEL AND SLANDER.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in 17letcafv. Times
Pub. Co., 40 Atl. 864, decided that a publication of judicial
Privileged proceedings, or of papers used therein, is privileged
Pubications, only if it is a fair and complete publication thereof,
Fairness and therefore a plea, which states that only part
of a bill for an injunction was published, and that that part
contained the allegations of fraud in the bill, will not bring the
publication within the privileged class.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
The Supreme Court of Maryland, in Smith v. Benick, 41
AtI. 56, decided that, where a proprietor of a public place of
Independent amusement employed another to make a balloon
Contractor, ascension, who was to exercise his.own judgment
Balloon in the premises, and who used implements not
Ascension contemplated, and without the proprietor's knowl-
edge, whereby a spectator was injured, the proprietor was not
liable, on the ground that the person employed was an inde-
pendent contractor.
MORTGAGES.
A mortgagee who takes possession of personal property of
Duty of a perishable or fluctuating value must sell within
Mortgagee In a reasonable time, or he becomes responsible for a
Possession depreciation in the value: Lomax v. Walk, 54-
Pac. (Ore.) 199.
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The ordinary rule is that where A sells to B and C parts of
a lot which is subject to a blanket mortgage, the part remain-
Foreclosure. ing to A shall, in the event of foreclosure, be sold
Order of Sale first, and B and C relieved from the obligation
which properly belonged to A and his land. Thompson v.
Bird, 4o Atl. (N. J.) 857, shows, however, that where B and C
have in their deeds expressly assumed the mortgage debt, the
equities are reversed, and A has now the right to require that
B's and C's portion shall be sold first to the relief of his part.
Where a railroad mortgage provides that it may be fore-
closed by the trustee upon request of a majority of the
Foreclosure, bondholders, and such has been made, the bond-
Parties holders need not be made parties; but where the
same trustee represents both the first and second mortgages,
and has filed bills to foreclose each, representative bondholders
of each class may be admitted as parties, in order to protect
their respective interests: Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Central Vt.
Ry. Co., 88 Fed. 622.
NEGLIGENCE.
Defendant was the owner of a lot beside the highway and
separated from it by a fence which had been allowed to
Fence, become rotten and unsafe. Plaintiff's son, aNegligent young child, who was walking along the high-
Repair, way, was attracted by some children playing on
Injury to the other side of the fence, so he placed one foot
Child on it and was about to place the other on (not,
however, for the purpose of climbing over), when the fence
fell and injured him.
On suit against defendant, the Court of Appeal of England
decided that the fence in a dangerous condition was a nui-
sance, that the act of the child in standing on it was what the
defendant might naturally have expected from a child, and
that, therefore, on the authority of Lynch v. Nurdin, i Q. B.
29 (j841), and kindred cases, plaintiff could recover: Harrold
v. Watney [1898], 2 Q. B. 328.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Boyle v. Borough
of Mahanoy City, 40 Atl. 1093, decided that one who, after
Ice on seeing a ridge of ice on the sidewalk, attempts to
Sidewalk walk along it, instead of stepping into the street,
as he could safely have done, is guilty of contributory negli-
gence, and cannot recover.
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In Van Orden v. Acken, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 843, it appeared
the plaintiff was lawfully in an unfinished building, standing
Presumption under an opening in the floors above. The brick-
of Negligence, work was not completed and a brick, from a cause
, Res lpsa unexplained at the trial, fell down through the
Loquitur " open space and struck the plaintiff. This state of
facts bore a close resemblance to that in Bryne v. Boadle, 2
Ex. 721, although in the latter case the plaintiff was on a
public street and the object was a barrel of flour falling from
a window. In the principal case the court, after referring to
the fact that the accident occurred on private property, said :
" It is not shown that the falling of a fragment of a brick or of
some other material, during the course of construction of a
large building, is so unusual or extraordinary a thing, in itself,
that negligence can be inferred from the fact of the fall alone."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has again ruled that
the failure of one to "stop, look and listen," before attempting
" Stop, Look to cross a railroad at grade, is not merely evidence
and Listen" of negligence, but negligence per se: Ritzman v.
P/dladelphia & Reading R. Co., 40 Atl. 975.
PRACTICE.
A suit was tried in the District Court upon the following
written stipulation, without other evidence: "It is hereby
Stipulation stipulated by and between the parties to the
to Waive above-entitled cause, through their respective
Jury Trial, counsel, that jury shall be, and is hereby waived,
Agreed
Statement of and the said cause submitted to the court for trial
Facts upon the foregoing statement of facts. For the
purpose of said trial, the said statement shall be considered by
the court to be in evidence, and as absolutely true." Judg-
ment was given against the plaintiffs for costs. On writ of
error, the Circuit Court reversed the judgment on the ground
that the facts stipulated were evidential and not the ultimate
facts to be found by the court. On a second trial, the court
below refused the request of the plaintiffs (a) for a jury trial;
(b) that they be allowed to introduce evidence contradicting
the written statements. The case was again taken to the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and it was held,
again reversing the judgment of the District Court: (b) that
other evidence not inconsistent with the stipulated facts might
be introduced by either party; (a) the waiver of a jury trial
only had relation to the first trial. The conclusion of the
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opinion of Bunn, District Judge, on this point is of interest.
He said: "A stipulation to waive, followed by an order of the
court, is not in the nature of a private contract founded upon
a consideration, which can only be set aside for fraud. It is a
proceeding in court, which is liable to be changed or modified
or set aside by order of the court, in its discretion, upon a
proper showing. And where the circumstances are changed,
as in the case of a change in judges, or other conditions, such
a discretion to relieve from a waiver might very properly be
exercised even on the first trial. . . . And where, upon a
proper application, the circumstances seem to justify it, we
think that a liberal discretion should be exercised by the trial
court in allowing either party to withdraw from such a waiver,
and to claim his right under the constitution:" Burnham v.
North Clicago St. Ry. Co., 88 Fed. 627.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently reaffirmed
Form of the point of practice that it is not necessary in a
Averment In positive affidavit of defence to aver that affiant
Affidavit of " is informed, believes and expects to be able to
Defence prove" the facts set up as a defence. Such a
formula is necessary only where the affiant cannot state the
facts of his own knowledge: Wolffv. Jacobs, 41 Atl. 27.
PROPERTY.
Anchor Brewing Co. v. Burns, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 1005. In
April, 1896, A lent B $300 to enable the latter to take out a
LiquorTax liquor tax certificate and B executed an assign-
Certificate, ment to A in form of a chattel mortgage whereby
Assignment, he sold and assigned " the liquor tax certificate
Replevin then in force" for his premises and any and every
renewal of the same. Not having been paid, A, in November,
1897, brought suit to recover possession of the liquor tax
certificate for the year 1897 to 1898, or its value. The court,
treating the action as one of replevin, held that the mortgage
could not create a lien on a certificate which was not in exist-
ence at the time, even if the certificate should be treated as a
chattel; but the court was further of opinion that a tax certifi-
cate is not a chattel at all, but merely a chose in action, in
which case replevin would clearly not be maintainable.
REAL PROPERTY.
The rule in Dunpor's Case, 4 Co. I I9, exists in full force in
Maryland. Plaintiff leased to M for five years, M covenant-
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Lease, ing not to assign or sublet the premises without
covenant plaintiff's written consent. Having obtained plaint-
Against iff's consent, M assigned the lease to defendant,
Assignment, who assigned it to J. This action was brought
Waiver against defendant for rent accruing during the
-time J was in possession of the premises.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held (i) that the obliga-
tion to pay rent depended upon privity of estate alone, and
defendant was not liable for the rent of J's tenancy, provided
he had a right to assign the lease, (2) and that defendant
possessed this right of assignment, since plaintiff, having waived
the covenant in respect to M, waived it respect to all other
sub-leases : Reid v. Brewing Co., 40 Atl. 877.
Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N. W. (Wis.) 273. The
Willow River, although not meandered, is a public navigable
Navigable stream. It appears to be sufficient to constitute
Waters, a stream of that class, if rivers are capable of float-
Right of ing the products of the country, such as logs or
Fishery rafts of lumber, to mill or market, even if it is pos-
sible to do so during only a part of the year. The defendant
was not guilty of trespass in fishing from a boat in the Willow
River, although the bottom was owned by the plaintiff, since
(Wisconsin) Laws 1893, c. 307, § 20, provides that all persons
may fish in public waters. The court was not unanimous.
Defendant's predecessor in title, the owner of several ad-
joining lots numbered 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, put them up at auction,
the terms of the sale being that the purchasers ofSale of Land,
Express lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 should covenant with their
Covenants, vendors to erect a dwelling house of specified
Implied value on the lots within a certain time. Plaintiffbought lot No. 2 at the auction, but lots 3, 4, 5
and 6 were not sold. They subsequently became the property
of the Urban Council, defendant, under the Local Government
Act of 1894. This was an action for an injunction to prevent
defendant from erecting a fire-engine house on lots 3, 4, 5
and 6.
The Chancery Division of England, in an opinion by
Stirling, J., refused to grant the injunction, holding that since
there was no express provision that the houses to be erected
on lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 should be always maintained as dwelling
houses, the court would not imply a restriction to that effect.
:Since the purchasers of these lots at the sale could have
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erected dwelling houses and then torn them down to use the
land for other purposes, there was no implied restriction that
the land should forever remain for dwelling purposes, and
defendant had a right to use the land as it pleased: Rolford"
v. Acton Urban Council [1898], 2 Ch. 240.
SALES.
An agreement under which goods were consigned to A for
sale contained the following provisions: That the goods
consignment should continue the property of the consignors
Contract, until a sale was made, "approved by them;" that
Construction A should notify the consignors "whenever a sale
is made, stating the terms thereof; " and* that A should sell
the goods " for account of consignors, and account to them
therefor." In an action of trover by the consign6rs against A
for the value of the goods, held, that A had the right to sell
the goods without the approval of the consignors: Iassett
et al. v. Cooper (Sup..Ct. of R. I.), 4o Atl. 841.
The general rule in the sale of personal property-caveat
emptor-applies as far as practicable to sales of choses in action.
Stock, For example, on a sale of stock, there is a war-
Subscription, ranty of genuineness, but none that the thing sold
Warranty is free of liens or defences. This principle was
considered, though not actually necessary to the decision, in
M'Clure v. Central Trust Co., 53 N. Y. Suppl. 188. The de-
fendant offered subscriptions to a certain stock and the plaintiff'
took a number of shares. Finding that the stock was encum-
bered, the plaintiff brought suit and endeavored to prove an
implied warranty. The court, however, applied the rule as
above, refusing the plaintiff's contention.
TRADE-MARKS.
In a suit in equity to enjoin unfair competition in trade, it
appeared that the defendant made and sold gin which he
Unfair labelled "Plymouth," with the design of palming
Competition, off -the article as imported, when in fact it was
Injunction made in this country; and that the label which
was affixed to the goods, though containing variations, was
designed to simulate a resemblance to the complainant's
goods sufficiently strong to mislead the consumer.
Held, that such a false use of a geographical name would
be enjoined : Collinsplatt et al. v. Finlayson et al. (Cir. Court,
S. D. N. Y.), 88 Fed. 693.
